It is common wisdom that labor parties have spread across the world from the nineteenth century on, bolstering expectations of workers-centered behavior. However, it is also known that labor unions tend to be fundamental components of populist parties, which are more heterogeneous and broad in their electoral appeals. Given their all-encompassing and assorted targets, populist leaders and their parties attempted to include dissimilar groups in their structures. In such organizations, workers have played a substantive role, and became frequent targets of discourse, platforms, and policy proposals. Nevertheless, it is not clear that these parties, even with a strong pro-worker rhetoric, will ultimately concentrate their legislative tasks on the development of Argentina is an ideal case for such an analysis, given that parties with and without explicit ties to labor attempted to develop connections to gather workers' votes; and that the party organization with ties to labor unions are also expected to represent other social groups. As is widely known, Argentine politics have witnessed the rise and persistence of the Justicialista Party, an organization heavily anchored in the image, ideas, and legacy of its founder, Juan Perón. Its appeal hinges on the defense of the poor and the deprived, but it is also historically linked to labor unions. However, appeals to workers have not been restricted to the Peronism. In fact, Argentina has a Socialist party, a middle-class oriented Radical party, and several center-left parties in which different branches of organized labor have participated. Considering the important share of legislators with labor background in recent decades (11%) and oscillations in the policy orientation of most parties (including the populist), the Argentine experience is a fruitful case for the analysis of variation in the labor-oriented behavior its representatives.
Introduction
Does legislative behavior of representatives vary as a function of their social background and group membership? Should variation in collective interests, preferences, and identities affect individual-level performance, even under similar party constraints? These questions are not new in contemporary political science, and have nurtured multiple approaches on the study of race, ethnicity, and gender. Specifically, contributions on how constitutive components of social identities (being a Latino, an African-American, an Asian, or a woman) make a difference over legislative performance are plentiful. However, to date, studies exploring how belonging to other social groups may affect individual level behavior in legislatures have been more the exception than the rule. With this realization in mind, this piece focuses on workers, a social group which has been analyzed in the literature regarding party formation, democratization, and development, but is largely missing from the literature on legislative behavior. Specifically, this essay deals with the empirical behavior of representatives with a background in labor unions, relying on the intuition that they should care about the preferences of their social bases classes of origin in their legislative activities.
It is common wisdom that labor parties have spread across the world from the nineteenth century on, bolstering expectations of workers-centered behavior. However, it is also known that labor unions tend to be fundamental components of populist parties, which are more heterogeneous and broad in their electoral appeals. Given their all-encompassing and assorted targets, populist leaders and their parties attempted to include dissimilar groups in their structures. In such organizations, workers have played a substantive role, and became frequent targets of discourse, platforms, and policy proposals. Nevertheless, it is not clear that these parties, even with a strong pro-worker rhetoric, will ultimately concentrate their legislative tasks on the development of ~ 3 ~ policies targeted toward labor. Similar doubts can be cast to the behavior of representatives with explicit links to labor organizations. What should their main course of legislative action be? Should representatives with labor ties concentrate their efforts to represent their group of reference, even considering the role of party pressures? Should they be the only ones who care about labor? Should only affiliates to the party that claims labor representation use time and resources to target workers? These questions motivate the current analysis, wherein the performance of legislators with a labor background will be assessed in Argentina.
Argentina is an ideal case for such an analysis, given that parties with and without explicit ties to labor attempted to develop connections to gather workers' votes; and that the party organization with ties to labor unions are also expected to represent other social groups. As is widely known, Argentine politics have witnessed the rise and persistence of the Justicialista Party, an organization heavily anchored in the image, ideas, and legacy of its founder, Juan Perón. Its appeal hinges on the defense of the poor and the deprived, but it is also historically linked to labor unions. However, appeals to workers have not been restricted to the Peronism. In fact, Argentina has a Socialist party, a middle-class oriented Radical party, and several center-left parties in which different branches of organized labor have participated. Considering the important share of legislators with labor background in recent decades (11%) and oscillations in the policy orientation of most parties (including the populist), the Argentine experience is a fruitful case for the analysis of variation in the labor-oriented behavior its representatives.
Through an analysis of about 120,000 bills drafted between 1983 and 2007, and the creation of a database of legislators' individual backgrounds, this work explores whether representatives with participation in labor unions systematically pursued the defense and promotion of worker's rights in their legislative tasks. Results show that deputies with ties to labor ~ 4 ~ organizations tend to draft twice as much legislation pertaining to workers' rights than the rest of their colleagues. However, contrary to expectations, such an increase is irrelevant to the membership to Peronism. The behavior of non-union linked Peronist legislators was more similar to non-Peronists without labor ties than to their Peronist co-partisans. A possible interpretation is that there was, in fact, a division of labor within the party. However, due to the strength of the effect in very dissimilar parties, it can also be concluded that group membership is a stronger proxy for bill drafting than parties in this specific case. This piece contributes to the understanding of representation of very different groups from those analyzed in the mainstream literature. It also provides evidence regarding how dissimilar factors foster behavior beyond party lines, without necessarily making leaders angry. Such findings open a space for deeper analyses of the impact of other identities and group references over congressional performance, and trigger new discussions on the impacts of the complex relationship among individual interests, collective cues, and party pressures in public activities.
Representation of Social Groups and Congruence
Multiple pieces in the literature have assessed how group identity can affect different patterns of political activity. Specifically, during the last decade, a considerable part of the discipline analyzed the institutional devices designed to further descriptive representation of marginalized groups (Htun 2004; Jones 2009; Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo 2012) , and the extent to which their presence implied substantive benefits for their peers (Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran 1998; Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004; Minta 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2010, among many others). Empirical contributions have analyzed patterns of behavior by legislators who are members of marginalized groups with strong identities and common past afflictions. Studies have
shown that the presence of delegates of the same ethnicity is positively correlated with the development of trust (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010) , increases in turnout (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Barreto, Segura and Woods 2004) , confidence in representatives (Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2008) , and joint cosponsorship (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Whitby 2002; Rocca and Sanchez 2008) , among others. Additionally, scholars studying gender and politics demonstrated that increases in the share of female legislators are associated with the promotion of policies for women (Schwindt-Bayer 2006 , 2010 Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; [Author] 2013), increases in their bill cosponsorship (Barnes 2016), and development of constituency service for their gendered bases of support (Norris 1996; Friedman 2000) . As it can be observed, the mentioned groups tend to cluster subjects along fixed, socio-demographic characteristics that can be used as focal points for social identification. Nonetheless, perceived group membership can also depend on other socially constructed sources of distinction that may rely on material conditions, common attributes, or similar preferences. Beyond discussions on whether these groups can be substantively represented i ; nothing prevents them from being heuristics for voters and legislators to develop representational links and expectations of policy congruence ii .
There is little empirical work which examines the behavior of legislators from marginalized groups aside form race, ethnicity, and gender; however, there are some exceptions. Some authors demonstrate that "the poor" can be identified as a social group for representation and legislative activities. After discussing the difficulty of conceptualizing class in empirical studies, Carnes the author emphasizes the difficulties these subjects face to monitor the fulfillment of their symbolic and material representation. Carnes and Lupu (2014) also bring social class to the fore, and reliably demonstrate that variation in occupational background affects the economic attitudes legislators take to assemblies. Similarly, Griffin and Anewalt-Remsburg (2013) find links between social class (wealth) and a legislator's willingness to block estate taxes, while Witko and Friedman (2008) show that congressmen with business backgrounds tend to behave more in line with firms'
interests. From a different perspective, Bianco (2005) demonstrates that a military background affects legislators' voting decisions on defense and foreign policy issues. Burden (2007) finds that religiosity is a strong predictor of behavior towards bill drafting on human cloning, religious freedom, and charity iii .
If there were ever a social group that has been recognized as a relevant political actor with self-consciousness, it would be workers. As a predominant component of most societies from the late nineteenth century on, there have been multiple instances of workers organizing to fix an apparent contradiction: a social class that tended to be at least the plurality group of almost every country whose material conditions made it a subaltern one iv . Therefore, workers coordinated efforts and gave birth to class-based parties that fought for their liberation and the implementation of pro-worker policies. Following the notion of descriptive representation, we should observe many working-class members occupying seats in parliaments and congresses once labor parties have been empowered. Given the bottom-up organization of workers, it would be reasonable for their delegates to public office to be heads of labor unions. Descriptive studies (Norris and Lovenduski 1995) show that this supposition held true. What we do not fully know yet is whether legislators from labor parties were truly champions of the group's cause. conditions of the working class. Thus, a broader set of policy proposals should be recognized in the legislative activity of labor parties' members. Labor party delegates in public office should not necessarily belong to 'workers' as a social group, nor should they be members of labor unions.
Even the empirical activities performed by members of the purest labor party with serious electoral expectations might not be fully devoted to the representation of workers' interests. Consequently, their expected behavior is still full of uncertainty.
Such ambiguity would be enhanced in scenarios wherein the representation of labor has traditionally relied on parties that targeted workers and incorporated labor unions as well as other, more diversified bases of support. In other words, it would be harder to define clear expectations of the individual and collective behavior by parties to which workers serve as just another group of reference.
Populist Parties and Workers' Representation
Numerous pieces in the literature have dealt with the definition, recognition and characterization of the controversial term populism. Far from reaching a consensus, scholars have largely failed to develop a generally accepted conceptual definition to understand a plethora of dissimilar leaders, parties, and movements vii . Several common patterns have been recognized, such as a top-down mobilization, the appeal to the so called subaltern groups (the poor, the excluded, and the marginalized), the development of a non-institutionalized relationship between the leader and the masses, and the redistribution of material resources from the top of the state (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001) . Based on the recognition of this multi-class coalition, behavioral expectations of the political and legislative performance of populist party members are diffuse and uncertain. If top-down dynamics remain in place, it could be argued that policy mandates defined by the leader
of the party/movement should be honored by any single member; and thus, find no significant variation within the party delegation. However, members of each constitutive group, including workers, might want to capitalize upon public activities on behalf of their bases, and therefore behave in a dissimilar manner. This is one of the main puzzles examined in this piece.
In Latin America, most parties traditionally labeled as populist have incorporated organized labor. Studies analyzing the Mexican PRI (Langston 2003 (Langston , 2013 , the Venezuelan Acción Democrática (Coppedge 1997; Crisp 1997) , the Peruvian APRA (Graham 1992; Burgess and Levitsky 2003) and Argentine Peronism (McGuire 1997; Levitsky 2001) have illustrated the historical role of labor unions in their organization, funding, decision-making processes, and electoral power. Based on that observation, it seems reasonable to expect that policies, activities, and even symbols of these parties tend to reflect the strong participation of this organized sector.
However, it is important to remember Levitsky's (2003) depiction of these organizations as having "more heterogeneous support bases, as they included elements of the unorganized urban and rural poor, the middle sectors, and, in some cases, the peasantry… and their ideologies were generally amorphous or eclectic, rather than Marxist or social democrat" (pp. 22). Therefore, it is not clear that workers should (or will) be genuinely represented by those parties which include their specific organizations.
The mixed theoretical expectations demand empirical verification. Following several influential contributions (Levitsky 1997 (Levitsky , 2003 , there is a case which fits perfectly for the assessment of the questions raised: The Argentine experience after its democratic restoration in 1983. As a country dominated by a populist party anchored in labor unions (Peronism) for decades, there is a significant share of representatives who have had a background in workers' associations.
Even though most of those belonged to Peronism, there were others nominated by different parties.
~ 10 ~ Peronist representatives also included delegates recruited from other sources such as business associations, religious groups, agriculture organizations, or local leadership roles. As another interesting source of variation, most labor unions remained loyal to Peronism even after the neoliberal turn it took in the 90's, while a minority of organized labor split off and joined other parties and movements. This scenario provides an interesting setting to verify whether the party and the individuals with ties to unions have, in fact, been the ones who concentrated the pursuit of interests of the working class. A closer approach is offered in the next section.
Argentina: Peronist Party, Representation of Labor, and Legislative Behavior
It is known that Peronism has long been the dominant force in Argentine politics. As extensively depicted by Levitsky (1997 Levitsky ( , 2001 Levitsky ( , 2003 , the Justicialista party was created by a colonel that established a direct relationship with his "pueblo." The organization was shaped as a labor-based, mass populist party characterized by "a massive national organization, large membership and activist bases, and strong linkages to working-and lower classes" (Levitsky 2003: 22) . This synergy did not just rely on people's emotional attachment to the policies implemented by Juan Perón and his wife Evita in the 1940s and 50s, but also boosted by the many benefits gained by labor unions like bargaining power vis-à-vis businessmen, collection of onerous union dues, and management of funds for social services (such as the provision of health or the ownership of hotels and recreational fields On the one hand, the presence of unionists in the lists of these new forces opened a space for the maintenance of descriptive representation. On the other, after the Peronists' turn away from workers, there was space for other parties to try to attract workers' votes. In fact, Argentina has a Socialist party with relevant strength in urban districts, and a Radical party with a center-left orientation and ties with middle-class oriented labor branches (i.e. insurances or banking services).
Finally, the new orientation of the Peronism may have led its members to discard the emphasis in labor representation, thereby diminishing the activities performed by the party delegation in
Congress. For these reasons, our knowledge over workers' representation is still scarce, and deserves empirical evaluation. Table 1 shows the changing shares of labor union delegates (whose identification will be addressed in the next section) occupying a seat in Congress. As expected, the return to democracy showed the peak in the trend, with declining rates thereafter. The number of delegates remained relevant enough to speculate about patterns of behavior centered on the representation of this social group. However, a brief review of the literature on the Argentine Congress may discourage the assessment of those behavioral trends. Specifically, scholarly work (Jones et al 2009) shows that government/opposition has always been the main dimension dividing voting patterns in the Chamber, findings reinforced by the realization of strong party discipline (Jones 1995) and cartelization (Jones and Hwang 2005, Calvo 2014 committees that dealt with each bill, the outcome, and a detailed one-paragraph description of the content of each bill.
Activities on behalf of workers are measured as the submission of bills that highlight the interests and rights of labor as a group. Scholars have employed numerous indicators of activities denoting congruence and responsiveness with specific sets of voters, such as share of local bills submitted (Gamm and Kousser 2010) , number of speeches (Rocca 2007) , amendments offered to relevant bills (Cook 1986; Hibbing 1986 ), responses to newsletters (Butler, Karpowitz and Pope 2012) , credit claiming messages (Grimmer et al 2012) , and trips to home districts (Crisp and Desposato 2004) . In this piece, I use one of the most utilized dependent variables in the literature, the number of targeted bills submitted by a legislator in a given period (Schlesinger 1966 . As a reliability check, I include center-right parties in Model 3 to take expected negative effects away from the baseline and see if results hold.
In line with the idea that variation in the composition of the legislative delegation of a group affects behavior, I include a covariate measuring the share of workers each party bloc has in each period.
Expectations bolster a positive effect for all but the state-level party covariates.
As controls for effects pointed out in the literature, I specify two sets of covariates.
Representation of workers might be related to district-level effects, wherein variation in the share of group members is likely to affect legislative concerns. I include the share of workers in the home municipality of each deputy (the smallest environment with available information) as a control. Data are from 1991 and 2001 census and the expected direction of covariates is positive.
Current literature states that ambition is a relevant predictor of targeted legislative activity (Schlesinger 1966 , Crisp et al 2004 . For this reason, I control for subsequent gubernatorial and mayoral candidacy xvi , with the expectation that legislators with executive expectations may opt to target more voters of all kinds, including workers. I also control for tenure, which reflects accumulated expertise that might affect bill drafting propensities. Career-level information was gathered for [Author] . Finally, time is a relevant factor for the descriptive representation of workers, which might also affect bill drafting patterns. In other words, if more labor union deputies used to get seats in the first post-democratic restoration periods, it could be derived that more 
Results
I run four models to test my hypotheses. Specifications change by the sequential addition of the interaction between being a Peronist and a labor union member (Model 2), the center-right bloc (Model 3) and controls for ambition and tenure (Model 4), and their outcomes are reported in Table 2 . targeted bills per biennium, while a colleague with labor union connections writes 7.49 bills in the same time frame. The size of the gap between groups strengthens the finding and bolsters the idea that the effect is genuine. It could also be argued, however, that this effect is related to the division of tasks within parties. To validate this, we would expect a strong and significant effect by the Peronist party (especially its labor members), as its solid compositional and temporal variation would make coordination and division of duties possible. Conversely, it would be harder for other parties with smaller delegations to allocate functional responsibilities in such a clear manner.
Party-level covariates show interesting results. Surprisingly, membership to the party that claims the monopoly of workers' representation is negatively related with the systematic submission of bills targeted to workers. In every model, the coefficient shows a negative sign with extremely high levels of significance. At first glance, the temptation of ratifying the populist nature of the movement and the subsequent dilution of workers' representation would seem intuitive: a median Peronist is systematically less likely to draft a labor based bill than a representative of small parties (omitted in the specifications), but also compared to the center-left, the Radicals and, very especially, Frepaso, a center-leftist party with urban anchorage. Following this interpretation, populism dilutes the expected pro-worker behavior at the aggregate level. To fully confirm this speculation, I test the interaction between party membership and background as unionist.
~ 19 ~
Interactions are specified from model 2 onward, and show systematic positive results.
Beyond the reported statistical significance of the coefficient, the linear combination of every interaction and its constitutive terms shows that joint effects are significant. In concrete terms, those Peronists that are a part of workers' organizations tend to draft more legislation vis-à-vis their group of reference, in contrast with their other comrades. However, the effect is still indistinguishable from labor union deputies from other blocs. A summary of this discussion is shown in Graph 1. The sharpest asymmetries can be found within the Peronist delegation: while deputies with ties with unions draft an average of 14 labor bills per their four-year mandate; every other Peronist tends to barely submit four in the same time span. In parallel, labor union membership seems to pierce party-level boundaries, as it is visible in the first two predictions at the left. In other words, partisanship does not make labor union members different in statistical sense: all labor union members tend to behave in a similar manner, which distinguished them from non-labor union members. The fact that labor and non-labor representatives of every party behave so similarly in this respect casts doubts about the idea of a coordinated division of legislative work.
Would leaders of a three-member bloc be able to align pro-labor tasks in an exactly same fashion as a powerful majority leader? My interpretation here gives more credit to the targeted representation story. In sum, labor was not divided, but united in the defense of workers' rights and interests through bill drafting.
Controls show an interesting performance across models. While the worker's population in sponsors' district does not have a significant effect over legislative activities, both tenure and gubernatorial ambition do, at least marginally in substantive terms. Lastly, the inclusion of the size of labor-based delegation in each party is negative and significant across models, suggesting that higher shares of workers might augment the contrast between their legislative priorities and those of every other co-partisan.
Finally, temporal controls are insignificant for these models, but become significant for the corrected measure of neoliberalism reported in the Appendix, which favors the idea that workers use the drafting of bills as a (symbolic) defensive tool during hard times. This is, in my perspective,
another piece of evidence of the representational goals performed by legislators with a background as workers.
Discussion
Do workers represent workers? Do the organizations that have coopted and rewarded labor unions tend to exhibit strong behavioral concerns vis-à-vis the rights of this social group? Findings demonstrate that descriptive representation of workers has correlates with legislative production in Argentina. However, membership in the Peronist party, the party with the most historical claims to the representation of workers, is not necessarily a strong predictor of congressional attention to workers. Rather, labor union membership is more important than, and independent of, partisanship.
Such findings can be interpreted in several ways, all of them with specific implications. The first is to consider whether theories suggesting that similarity in identity and shared interests in constitutive groups also hold for second-order organizations. This piece shows that, similarly to race, ethnicity and gender, connections to workers as social group positively influences legislators'
propensity to draft similar kinds of bills. This finding contributes to multiple literatures interested in the role of socialization and extends its impact over legislative settings, integrating two literatures that had not been frequently considered together. Another dimension to highlight is ~ 21 ~ related to the concept of populism, and the specific performance of a very successful case of electoral performance and adaptation like the Peronism. The finding that only those legislators with ties with labor tend to develop congressional activities related to workers force us reconsider its recalcitrant pro-labor rhetoric and understand it as what originally envisioned by its founder: a broad and encompassing movement, and an organization with a pragmatic orientation. As we have seen, no more than 16% of its congressional delegates belonged to the organized workers. Why should we expect a broad and general orientation to this group, if it is not a Labor Party?
Such findings also open inquiries on the behavior of other organized groups that may be also trigger social identification (i.e. farmers or small businessmen). In this sense, an almost natural additional test of this argument is the analysis of the legislative performance of the Mexican PRI, whose historical organization was built up over the basis of four main groups: workers, peasants, popular sectors, and the territorial structure (Langston 2003) . It would be of high interest to disentangle whether delegates of each of these subsets tended to forge representation of their original bases of support, beyond its rigid pyramidal structure.
In sum, this piece is the first attempt to recognize labor-based activities at the legislative level across and within parties in Argentina, paying special attention to the role of deputies with a background as labor unionists. Results are conclusive: social background as workers does make a difference in congressional bill drafting, beyond party membership. Interestingly, unlike what stories and mythical tales would suggest, the intermediation of the Peronism is not a necessary condition for the representation of workers´ interests in Argentina. (Sachs 1990; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991) , other perspectives stretched the concept so much that neoliberal presidents like Alberto Fujimori in Peru or Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil fit well into the category (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1999) . viii See Garrett and Way (1997) , Murillo (2002) and Murillo and Ronconi (2004) ix Examples are MODEJUSO, Corriente Sur, and Frente Grande. See Murillo (1999) x Data is official and was gathered from the website of the Cámara de Diputados: www.hcdn.gob.ar. xi For the creation of the keywords, I first reviewed the literature and created a preliminary list. Then, I consulted four specialists in labor studies, who hand checked them based on their criteria. I compiled their suggestions, and had each of them review the tentative sample. After two rounds of collective feedback, we all agreed on the accuracy of the final selection. Keywords are listed in the Appendix A. xii Some keywords classified specific bills incorrectly for reasons of wording (especially the word "trabajo"), or because the keywords were included in legislation against labor. Criteria to recode these bills were qualitative (they clearly had nothing to do with labor or contracted workers' rights). After two rounds of hand revision (one using a random sample, and a second checking those recognized for the keyword trabajo), eleven bills were recoded as a zero, a number that wouldn't have affected results in any case, indeed. xiii As a reliability check, I discussed the preliminary classification with specialists on Argentine legislative politics, current staff members of Congress and former deputies, and supplemented the identification with internet searches xiv Programa Elites Parlamentarias de América Latina, conducted by Universidad de Salamanca (http://americo.usal.es/oir/elites/)
